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  Privatization was one of the significant public policy adopted by many 
countries in the last two decades.  Previous and recent studies on its 
efficacy have focused mostly on the gains at the firm and industry levels.  
Differing from that approach, this paper attempts to reconsider impacts 
of the policy from a viewpoint of the economy as a whole via a 
theoretical examination.  Specifically, it supposes an economy with two 
goods, two producers and two consumers. Within this economy, one of 
the consumers is assumed to be not able to obtain one good that is 
regarded as a necessity. Since it is considered that a basis of government 
intervention is to provide some necessity to people who would not be 
able to obtain it otherwise, government intervention on some production 
is assumed to satisfy this purpose.  
 
Utilizing the method of comparative statics, the paper shows how the 
welfare of different kinds of consumers is affected by this intervention. 
Specifically, it argues that the intervention can decrease the welfare of 
one consumer and increases that of the other, and that it leads to higher 
social welfare, showing a rationale for government intervention into the 
production process.   
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1.  Introduction and Review of Literature 
 
One of the most important public policy adopted after the late 80’s is the privatization of 
public sector assets and activities.  The generally perceived measure of success of this policy was 
anchored on achieving microeconomic efficiency and also on reducing public sector borrowing.  
Basing purely on these two objectives, it can be said that privatization indeed have made important 
changes in the behavior of privatized firms as well as significantly improved the fiscal balance of 
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governments in many countries.  Various data are available to confirm the veracity of such claims.  
However, Sheshinksi and Lopez-Calva correctly point out that it is not enough to look only at 
these two aspects when assessing the success of the policy.  While it is primordial to see the 
achievement of higher allocative and productive efficiency, it is equally important to see whether 
privatization has helped improve the overall welfare of society.  Specifically, it will be of 
particular interest to see if the freed resources from the government budget have been allocated to 
the welfare of the economy as a whole.  
  It is relevant to note that various studies undertaken by now provide strong support for 
privatization. Empirical and descriptive studies have shown how internal efficiencies and profits 
have increased among firms that have been privatized.  Likewise, the achievement of budget 
surpluses in Latin American, as well as some economies in Asia, was made possible by 
privatization.  Among the latest works done in this area is Muggings and Netter (2001) entitled 
“From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization.”  Though the work 
surveys the recent contribution analyzing privatization and their effects, its review is limited on the 
impact of privatization on the capital markets, and does not cover the effect on overall welfare. 
Ramanadham (1989) has also done the same arguments concerning the earlier analysis of the 
impacts of privatization.  His review also suggests a number of measures with which increase of 
efficiency in the firm, labor and the government can be assured.  However, he also acknowledges 
the need to look beyond profitability and surpluses, and to see the contribution of privatization to 
the overall well-being of the community.  Galal et al (1994) in a survey of privatized firms of 4 
countries gave an overview of arguments of the net welfare change and a per industry and sector 
welfare impact.  This study used an approach that compares the performance of the privatized 
firms and a hypothetical public corporation.  It suggests that privatization has also a positive 
impact on overall welfare.  
Chisari et al (1999) were one of the first who made an analysis of the distributive effects 
of privatization in Argentina by utilizing a general equilibrium approach.  Similarly, Paredes (2001) 
performed a similar study for Chile.  Their findings suggest that while the poor does benefits from 
privatization, their benefits are not as large as those otherwise obtainable without privatization.   3
Sheshinski (2000) sums up these findings as that privatization achieves only efficiency and brings 
welfare gains in this respect and thus that it is not satisfactory from distributional viewpoint.  As 
Sheshinski points out, there are indeed other factors that need to be carefully studied.  They 
become more imperative when considering most developing countries.  Specifically, those 
countries that have successfully divested are now again experiencing serious fiscal difficulties as 
in the case of Argentina and Brazil in Latin America and the Philippines in Asia.   
Note, moreover, that privatization as a policy has different aims and purposes among 
countries, and thus its method of implementation varies from country to country.  Similarly the 
cause or causes of its adoption as a policy is as diverse and complex as its aims.  Kikeri, Nellis and 
Shirley (1992) and Aharoni (1991) pointed out that the industry level arguments in favor of state 
ownership often have to do with market failures.  These cases occur most often in public utilities 
in which the natural monopoly problem exists.  Ramamurti (1993) found also that this situation is 
notable in industries requiring large physical infrastructure investments such as transport, 
telephone, water, electricity and communications which are considered vital for daily living.  This 
suggests that their accessibility and affordability become more important especially for the poor.  
Vickers and Yarrow (1991), in their seminal work on privatization, categorize 
privatization into three types: a) privatization of competitive firms, b) privatization of monopolies, 
and c) contracting out of publicly financed services.  Due to this categorization, the subject of this 
paper is on the privatization of the second type, i.e. privatization of monopoly that produces some 
public utility.  Specifically, we will consider a situation wherein the government concerns 
producing a public utility good, say water
‡, which a number of consumers are not able to consume 
due to non-availability and non-affordability.  The argument may be compared to the approach by 
Chisari of developing a general equilibrium model in order to clarify the distributive as well as the 
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efficiency impact of privatization.  While Chisari provided a numerical evaluation of privatization, 
this study does the same from theoretical viewpoint by the method of comparative statics.  
The paper argues the question in four parts. Section 2 describes the model and 
assumptions made.  Section 3 presents the analysis using comparative statics.  Section 4 
reconsiders the conditions that justify government intervention.  The final section summarizes the 
results and provides a conclusion. 
 
2.  Model  
2.1 Basic Model 
  There exist two goods, good 1 and 2, and two factors, labor and capital.  Both goods are 
assumed to be necessary goods, i.e. vital for daily consumption.  The economy is assumed to have 
two kinds of economic agents, consumers and firms.  The number of consumers is assumed to be 
two, and both seek to maximize their utility by choosing optimal consumption of two goods. On 
the other hand, there exist two firms.  Firm 1 produces good 1 and Firm 2 produces good 2 by 
hiring two factors.  In the competition, both maximize production profit.  In the case of 
government intervention, government takes the role to produce good 2 so as to minimize 
production cost. 
2.2 A Model of Competitive Economy:  Economy after Privatization 
As a starting point, we suppose an economy that has undergone privatization and all 
goods are supplied and demanded competitively by consumers and firms.   
1) Behavior of each agent in the economy is explained as follows: 
A. Firm  The production function of each firm is given by ) , (
j j j j K L F Q = , where 
j Q is the 
amount of good produced and
j L and
j K are the capital and labor hired by firm j,  j = 1, 2. 
j F ’s 
are assumed to be concave.   Firms are both assumed to be profit maximizers taking given prices 
of goods and factors.  Let us assume good 1 as numeraire and its price is 1, and denote price of 
good 2 by p.  Also, wage rate and rental rate of capital are denoted by r and w, respectively.  
Behavior of firms to maximize profit is then given by: 
 Max   } , , {
j j j K L Q   
j π  = 
j j j j rK wL Q p − −      (1)   5
   
 
subject to      ) , (
j j j j K L F Q =         ( 2 )  
where  1
1 = p  and  P p =




jF p w = ,  j =  1 ,   2          ( 3 )  
j
K









=  h = L,K.  (2)-(4) determine  ) , , (
j j j K L Q as a function of p, r  and w.   
B. Consumer  Let us call two consumers A and B, respectively. Consumer i owns labor,  i L  and 
capital,  i K .  They maximize utility under the budget constraint as follows:  
 Max  ) , (
2 1
i i i C C U U =          ( 5 )  
subject to 
2 1
i i i i pC C rK wL + = +        ( 6 )  
where 
j
i C denotes consumer i’ s of consumption of good j, i = A, B and  j = 1,2.   i U ’s are assumed 


















= ,   i = A, B and j = 1, 2.   (6)  and  (7) determine 
j
i C  as a function of p, w and r. 
2) The equilibrium in the economy without government intervention is given by the following four 
market equilibrium conditions: 
1 1 1
B A C C Q + =           ( 8 )  
2 2 2
B A C C Q + =           ( 9 )  
L L L L L B A ≡ + = +
2 1        ( 1 0 )  
K K K K K B A ≡ + = +
2 1         ( 1 1 )    6
The first two equations express the equilibrium of the two produced goods, and the latter two show 
respectively that labor and capital markets clear.  As is known, one of these is redundant by the 
Walras Law and therefore the remaining three equilibrium conditions determine three prices p, w 
and  r  in the model economy. Let us denote the equilibrium values of the variables by 
(
* * * * 2 * 1 * 2 * 1 * 2 * 1 , , ; , ; , , , r w p Q Q C C C C B B A A ). 
2.3 Government-Intervened Economy:  Economy before Privatization 
1) Let us then explain the economy prior to privatization in which the government produces good 
2.  Firstly, good 2 is assumed to be produced utilizing the same production technology as Firm 2 
above.  The difference is that the government is not a profit-maximizer but intends just to produce 
a specified amount of the second good, denoted as 
2 Q , so as to minimize its cost.  Then, the 
behavior of public production is represented as: 
Min     
2 2 rK wL +  
 Subject  to  ) , (
2 2 2 2 K L F Q =        ( 1 2 )  
where 
2 L and 
2 K   are hired at the market wage and rental rate.   The FOCs for government 
production are then, together with (12), given by: 
0
2 2 = − L K rF wF          ( 1 3 )  
where (12) and (13) determine 
2 L and 
2 K as functions of w and r.   
On the other hand, the consumers and Firm 1 behave in the same manner as explained in 
Subsection 2.2.1. 
2) The equilibrium of the economy is represented by the same conditions as in Section 2.2.2, 
equations (8), (10) and (11), except that of good 2, which is now given by: 
2 2 2
B A C C Q + =           ( 1 4 )  
Like in Section 2.2.2, one of these four is redundant.  We denote this equilibrium by 
( r w p Q C C C C B B A A ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ; ˆ ; ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ 1 2 1 2 1 ) 
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3. Government Intervention and the Welfare of the Economy: 
1) Government intervention into the production of good 2 will, in general, have a distortionary 
effect.  Those effects on the equilibrium are analyzed by comparative statics.  Specifically, by 
considering 
2 Q  as the control variable, the effects of its change on the equilibrium values of the 
unknowns can be obtained by comparative statics.   
2) A direct way to apply comparative statics is to combine (market) equilibrium conditions (8), 
(10), (11) and (14) with the optimality conditions for consumers and producers, (3), (4), (13), (6) 
and (7), and to consider how are the effects of the change in 
2 Q .  However, as far as the present 
model concerns, this direct way seems to blur the arguments.  Instead, in order to make the story 
clearer and to find an acceptable result, we consider the following way of argument.  First, note 
that the above equilibrium and optimality conditions are divided into three groups.  The first group 
is the relations that determine the factor allocation together with the amount of products.  The 
second is the relations that define factor prices based on factor allocation.  Last is the group 
composed of the market equilibria of products and optimality conditions for consumers. 
  Specifically, the first group composes of the following four relations: 
B A L L L L + = +
2 1          ( 1 0 )  
B A K K K K + = +
2 1          ( 1 1 )  
2 2 2 2 ) , ( Q K L F =          ( 1 2 )  
0
2 1 2 1 = − L K K L F F F F          ( 1 3 ’ )  
where (13’) is rearranged by suppressing r and w and substituting (3) and (4) into (13).  These four 
equations determine  ,
1 L ,
2 L
1 K and 
2 K . 
   The second group is the following and determines r and w recalling that (3) and (4) hold 
for 
1 F , 
1
L F w =          ( 3 )  
1
K F r =            ( 4 )    8




B C  
2
A C  and 
2
B C ,  
2 2 1 Q C C B A = +         ( 1 4 )  
0
2 1 = − A A U pU         ( 7 a )  
  A A A A rK wL pC C + = +
2 1         ( 6 a )  
  0
2 1 = − B B U pU         ( 7 b )  
  B B B B rK wL pC C + = +
2 1         ( 6 b )  
Note that since one of (8) and (14) is redundant after (10) and (11) are utilized in group 1, we here 
pick up (14) and suppress (8).  Note also that the first group of conditions specifies where we are 
on the production frontier (see Figure 1) and the second group gives factor prices that prevail at the 
point of production.   
  Then, comparative statics in the present interpretation goes as follows:  first, a marginal 
increase of good 2, d
2 Q , leads to the changes of 
i L  and 
i K  so that satisfies the first group of 
equations.  These changes in 
i L  and 
i K defines the changes of w and r via the second group of 
relations.  Lastly, under the condition that given the changes of  
2 Q , r and w, the third group of 
equation shows how the unknowns there are affected or changed. 
3) Let us now consider these comparative statics specifically.  First, the total differentiation of four 
relations in the first group with respect to its unknowns and 
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a a a a
F F K L
      ( 1 5 )  
where   , 4 j a  j = 1, 2, 3, 4 is defined as follows: 
2 1 2 1
41 L KL K LL F F F F a − =  (<0), 
2 1 2 1
42 L KK K LK F F F F a − =   (>0) 
2 1 2 1
43 LK K KL L F F F F a − =  (>0),  
2 1 2 1
44 LK K KK L F F F F a − =  (<0) 




nh F F 2 , 1 = j  ,  K L h n , , = ,   n h ≠ .   9












D  =  ) ( 41 43 a a −  > 0    (16) 
where 
1 D is the determinant of the matrix of the left hand side of (15) and 
1 D is calculated as 
follows: 
=
1 D ) ( ) ( 41 43
2
42 44
2 a a F a a F K L − − −   (<0)      (17) 
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Then, substitution of (16) into (19) gives the detailed expression of 
2 Q d
dw




Finally, since changes of w and r are already known above, changes of  s C
i
j'  and p have 
to satisfy the following relations that are obtained by total differentiation of the third group 
relations as to unknowns and 
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§ See Appendix A as to the detail of derivation.   10
where  , ij b   , 4 , 2 = i  j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is defined as: 
,
21 11
21 A A U pU b − =
22 12
22 A A U pU b − = ,  ,
21 11
43 B B U pU b − =
22 12
44 B B U pU b − = .   
4) Let us denote by 
2 D  the determinant of the matrix of the left hand side of (20).  
2 D is 
calculated as follows: 
=
2 D  ( )[] ( )[ ]
1 2
43 21 22 44 43 21
2 1
B B A A U C b p b b b p b b C U − − + − −     (21) 
Our main concern here is in the impact of change of 
2 Q on overall utility or welfare.  To 
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Assuming that the social welfare is given by W( ) , B A U U  ,the impact of the change of 
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j ’s are obtainable from (20), the sign of these relations is indefinite in general 
depending both on the relative magnitude of changes of  p, r and w and the distribution of factor 
ownership.   
5) In order to overcome this difficulty, let us recall what happens in a single consumer economy 
(see Ang 2003).     11
For this purpose, let us assume that the representative consumer’s utility is given by 
) , (
2 1 C C U  where 
i C denotes consumption of goods by the consumer.  Then, the utility change of 
the consumer is shown as:   
2 Q d
dU


































U      =   [ ] 21 21




U =  and the second equality is due to the market equilibrium condition 
i i C Q = , i = 1,2.  
Let us now imagine the competitive equilibrium that obtains in the representative 
consumer economy here.  The equilibrium is shown by point E in Figure 1.  Specifically, with 
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p = =          ( 2 7 )      
Substituting (26) and (27) into (25), 
2 Q d
dU
= 0 at competitive point E in Figure 1.  This 
corresponds to that the production frontier and an indifference curve of the consumer are tangent 
to each other at E.  Then, imagine an equilibrium that obtains with government intervention on 
good 2.  More specifically, imagine the equilibria that obtain at G and H in Figure 1.  At each point, 
an indifference curve is tangent to the budget line that represents factor income obtainable at the 
equilibrium as is drawn in the figure.  As is apparent from the figure, at G (below E), 






















 point  E in Figure 1    (28)   12
The same result should or has to be confirmed by comparative statics of the 
equilibrium/optimal conditions for the consumer.  This is explained in detail in Appendix B.   
FIGURE 1  
 
 
6) In the present case with two consumers, the method in Subsection 3.5) above is not applicable 
however.  Moreover, applying the method of comparative statics to (6a), (6b), (7a), (7b) and (14) 
leads in general to an indefinite answer as to the utility change of two consumers and thus of social 
welfare.  If the distribution of factors differs much from a proportional one, as understood from the 
detailed arguments of Subsection 3.4) (see Appendix B), it will be difficult to clearly identify the 
effect on social welfare.  So, in order to make the argument simple and clear, let us assume further 
that the distribution of factor ownership between the two consumers is (almost) proportional, i.e., 
consumer A owns 100a% of both labor and capital and consumer B 100b%, a + b = 1.  This 
assumption largely simplifies our argument that follows.  Specifically, the assumption says that the 
factor income of each consumer changes proportionally to that of the total factor income.  Then, 
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(say at G) before the change of 
2 Q , then increase of 
2 Q raises factor-income more than what is 
caused by product-price change and it improves both consumers welfare.  On the other hand, if we 
are above E on the production frontier (say at H), the increase in 
2 Q  decreases factor-income 
more than what is caused by the product-price change, hence lowering the utility of both 
consumers. 
 
4. Privatization vs. Government Intervention 
1) The arguments in Section 3 shows that as far as income change of both consumer is 
proportional to total factor-income change, and if competitive equilibrium prevails before the 
intervention, the effect of government intervention into production is deterioration of the welfare 
of both consumers and thus of the society.  However, why then government intervention is 
required and justified? 
2) In order to explore the reasons, let us see why, say, clean water is provided by the government 
in some circumstances.  The reason seems to be as follows: the poor were unable to obtain clean 
water when it is provided by a private producer.  However, clean water is essential for the upkeep 
of everyone’s life.  Furthermore, it is not only indispensable for life, but also enhances the 
productive roles of the poor and could increase the welfare of society. 
3) The above reasoning for public production of clean water can be explained a little differently.  
First, clean water is a merit good, because the inability to consume it will have serious effects such 
as health deterioration, thereby lowering the welfare of the society as a whole.  Clean water is 
indispensable for life and its supply to all has a deterministic meaning for the welfare of the 
society as a whole.  Second, the supply of clean water usually requires a large infrastructure and 
therefore huge investments.  It then implies such industry is easy to fall naturally into a monopoly.  
As is well known, a monopoly producer may maximize its profit by controlling both its product 
quantity and price, leading to market failure.  These reasons also justify the government 
production of clean water.    14
4) The question then is how the result in Section 3 and the above arguments are consistently 
reconciled. Utilizing again the government intervention into water supply, let us consider and 
formalize how it is justified from a theoretical viewpoint.  In the following, we provide a possible 
formal explanation that satisfies this purpose.  For this, let us assume that before government 
intervention such a situation prevailed where the poor cannot obtain clean water due to some 
reasons such as inaccessibility or non-affordability, and that government intervention via direct 
production makes it possible for the poor to obtain it.  More specifically, assume that good 2 is a 
necessary good (water) that the poor (Consumer B in the present model) cannot obtain before 
government intervention.  This situation means that Consumer B is at corner optimum consuming 
only good 1 of 
# 1





) 0 , (
) 0 , (
# 1 2
# 1 1
>          ( 2 9 )  
Let us denote this equilibrium by (
# # # # 2 # 1 # 1 # 2 # 1 , , ; , ; 0 , , , r w p Q Q C C C B A A ).  Then, the social 
welfare in this situation is given as follows: 
)] 0 , ( ), , ( [
# 1 # 2 # 1
B B A A A C U C C U W W =      ( 3 0 )    
5) Let us then assume that government intervenes to increase production of good 2 and that the 
increase of good 2 make it possible for the poor to buy the good, say, by lowering its price.  Let us 
denote the equilibrium after government intervention by ( r w p Q C C C C B B A A ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ; ˆ ; ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ 1 2 1 2 1 ) in which 












=           ( 3 1 )  
where  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ 2 1










ˆ = ,  j = A,B, i =1,2.  More importantly, since Consumer B 
now attains interior optimum, we may assume that: 
 
# # 2 # 1 2 1 ) , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ
A A A A A A A A U C C U C C U U ≡ < ≡        
           ( 3 2 )      15
 
# # 1 2 1 ) 0 , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ
B B B B B B B U C U C C U U ≡ > ≡  
and that 
  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) , (
# #
B A B A U U W U U W <         ( 3 3 )  
Of course, (33) is made possible only if the increase of Consumer B’s utility is larger than the 
decrease of consumer A’s utility and/or  B W  is larger than  A W .  The latter is usually assumed by 
supposing concavity of W.  The former seems to be plausible recalling, first, that the government 
intervention enables the poor to consume a necessity, and second, that utility decrease of the rich 
would be smaller than the increase of that of the poor since the rich attained interior optimum 
before intervention while the poor has not. 
6) Such a possibility as (32) and (33) becomes more plausible if factor-income for the poor 
increases more than that its decrease for the rich after government intervention. These possibilities 
appear to exist in the real world, and they would provide a validation of the case of government 
intervention. 
 
5.  Conclusive Comments 
First, we have presented two sorts of arguments of government intervention into 
production.  Government intervention into production of public-utility goods affects consumers’ 
welfare differently.  The argument in Section 3 shows that when all individuals attain interior 
optimum, before and after intervention, government intervention lowers the welfare of all and 
deteriorates the social welfare in general.  On the other hand, if government production increases 
supply of the good that some people cannot obtain before intervention and the intervention makes 
it possible for the people to obtain the good, it increases not only the welfare of that group of 
people, but of society as a whole.  The latter situation is probable if the government intervenes to 
supply a good that is important for all but is too scarce or expensive for some.  In this case, the 
government intervention actually bridges the gap between supply and demand that makes possible 
to all consumption of the necessity goods.  In such a case, even if government intervention 
introduces some distortion, it will be possible to raise the social welfare.  Note also that such rise   16
of social welfare reflects a distributional consideration as argued by Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 
and the arguments in Section 4 provide its theoretical interpretation.   
These discussions suggest the fact that pre-intervention conditions matter.  Clearly in the 
cases we have discussed above, the latter condition of one group of people unable to consume a 
certain good represents an inequitable situation.  Thus, if this kind of situation prevails prior to 
intervention, government intervention should address it directly.   Conversely, in the reverse policy 
of privatization, the government should consider the pre-privatization conditions.  Conditions that 
often exist in the real world are that inefficiency prevails in most government-operated firms.  
Policy objective in this condition, therefore, is to improve efficiency.  
  Second, if the government intervention into production is justified as suggested above, it 
implies that this justification will be invalidated as the economy grows and people in the economy 
acquire larger incomes.  This is simply because economic growth or plenty itself would imply that 
all obtain the necessities without government intervention.  Along this line, we can say that the 
government intervention should be time-bound recalling its objective of making affordable 
consumption of true necessities. When this objective is achieved, government should divest itself 
of ownership and leave the firm’s operations to market forces.   Experience shows that as long as 
the government engages in production, people usually consider as if the goods produced by the 
government should be provided at the same price as the intervention was initiated.  However, as 
the economy grows, the price of factors shall not stay the same.  If the government continues the 
intervention, then they would tantamount to providing subsidy while incurring losses.  This is 
where the question of efficiency rises.  The longer this condition persists, the larger the efficiency 
losses will be.  It is then clear that the objective of privatization here is to secure efficiency gains 
for the economy.  
  Finally, time-bound intervention as discussed above may work well in competitive 
industries, but not in industries exhibiting monopolistic tendencies.  If we suppose that there exists 
a monopoly in the provision of some necessity good before government intervention and 
government supplies the good at a competitive price after intervention, then the change in price of 
the necessity would be not marginal but substantial.  This possibility necessitates that the   17
arguments in Section 3 to be adjusted appropriately and could in general enhance the arguments in 
Section 4.  Specifically, a size of decrease of price of necessity goods can improve the welfare of 
the poor more than when the change is marginal, though this has to be confirmed rigorously.  
However, if privatization is considered after competitive pricing is reached, the issue of equity 
may well reappear due to the monopolistic nature of the industry.  This leads us to the issue of 
regulation to which an array of other complementary policies may be needed to ensure that equity 
considerations are maintained vis-à-vis efficiency.  However, it provides another case of interest to 
which this present paper pays no attention.   18
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Where the third and fourth equality are due to (3), (4) and (13).   20
B. Comparative Statics for the Single Consumer Equilibrium 
 
1) The conditions in representative consumer economy corresponding to (14), (7a), (7b), (6a), (6b) 
are as follows: 
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where  dI ≡ 





L +   and is expanded by substitution of (16) and (19) as  







1 a a F a a F K a a F a a F L I KL KK LK LL − + − + − + − =  (A6) 
Also, let us denote the determinant of this matrix of the left hand side of (A5) by 
3 D , which is 
given by direct calculation as: 
 
3 D  =  ) (
21 11 2 1 U pU C U − −         ( A 7 )  
Then, the impact of the change in 
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D  =   p U U pU C dI U
1 22 12 2 1 ) ( − − + .          ( A 9 )    21






D =   )] 2 ( [
22 12 11 2 2 1 1 U pU U p C dI U U − + − +     (A10)
  
2) Though (A10) appears not to directly confirm the result in (28), it is interpreted to mean the 
following: 
First, note that (A10) is composed of two terms.  We may consider that the first 
term, dI U
1 , represents the income effect and the second term represents the substitution effect.  
Second, we know that the substitution effect is negative as it is opposite the sign of the change in 
price.   Third, then let us pay attention to the term  dI U
1 .  Note that dI is rearranged from (A6) as: 
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Though  ) (
1 1
KL LL KF LF +  and  ) (
1 1
KK LK KF LF +  appear difficult to be signed, note that they are 
expanded further, noting that the first group of equilibrium-optimal conditions (10), (11), (12) and 
(13’) as the conditions corresponding to the following problem: 
 Max      ) , (
1 1 1 1 K L F Q =  
 Subject  to  L L L = +
2 1  
    K K K = +
2 1  
    ) , (
2 2 2 2 K L F Q =  













λ  where λ is the Lagrange multiplier to the last constraint of the 
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Substituting (A11) to  ) (
1 1
KK LK KF LF +  leads to: 
 
1 1






















































        ( A 1 2 )  
where zero-order homogeneity of 
j











are positive, the sign of the whole term depends on the sign of
2 Q d
dλ
.   












  and it becomes smaller by concavity of 
i F  
when moving along the production frontier starting from its right, see Figure 1.  Therefore the 




when we introduced the intervention at the competitive equilibrium, i.e., when starting at point E 
in Figure 1.    At this point, we can interpret this because MRT = MRS at E as explained in Section 
3.5.  Then, combining the above features, we finally find that   2 dQ
dU
 is negative above E and is 
positive below E.  